The year 379/8 BC stands as a pivotal moment in ancient Greek history, a period of complex political maneuvering and dramatic shifts in alliances. Recent scholarship, particularly in the journal Historia, has revisited this crucial year, highlighting the challenges of piecing together a coherent narrative from often contradictory sources like Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus. Traditionally, historians have favored Xenophon, a contemporary writer, over the later accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch. However, new perspectives, especially the analysis of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, suggest Diodorus, drawing upon the earlier historian Ephorus, may offer a more reliable, or at least equally valuable, perspective.
This post delves into the intricate events of 379/8 BC, re-examining the available evidence with an open mind. By focusing on the factional politics within Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, we can shed light on the motivations behind seemingly contradictory actions and policies. This analysis aims to provide a narrative account of the period, from the Theban exiles’ daring recapture of the Cadmeia to the formation of the Second Athenian Sea League, while acknowledging the inherent uncertainties and relying on reasoned conjecture to bridge gaps in our sources.
Theban Uprising: Cracks in the Spartan Hegemony
By 379 BC, Sparta, under the assertive leadership of King Agesilaus II, appeared to have solidified its dominance over mainland Greece. The Peace of Antalcidas (387 BC) had effectively neutralized threats from Athens and Thebes, and Spartan garrisons in key cities like Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Thebes itself ensured Boeotian compliance. Sparta’s victory against Olynthus further secured its position in northern Greece. These years were a testament to Spartan military might and Agesilaus’ strategic vision.
This military success translated into political control. Pro-Spartan oligarchic factions held power in many Greek cities, including Thebes, where Leontiades led a government supported by a Spartan garrison on the Cadmeia citadel. However, this Spartan-backed order was not without its challengers. Anti-Spartan factions, particularly in Thebes, simmered with resentment. Following the death of their leader Ismenias, Theban exiles sought refuge in Athens, finding sympathy among Athenians wary of Sparta’s growing power.
In Athens, a conservative faction led by Callistratus of Aphidna held sway. Callistratus advocated for maintaining peaceful relations with Sparta while cautiously expanding Athenian influence in the Aegean, primarily to secure vital grain routes. Athens’ defensive alliance with Chios exemplifies this cautious approach, explicitly affirming its adherence to the Peace of Antalcidas. While Sparta might have preferred Athens to remain completely isolated, this limited Athenian engagement was within the bounds of the treaty.
However, Sparta’s increasingly assertive actions, often perceived as violations of the Peace of Antalcidas, fueled opposition throughout Greece. Athenian imperialists, yearning for a return to Athenian prominence, viewed the Theban exiles’ plight as another example of Spartan overreach. These Athenians, eager to challenge Spartan hegemony, were likely sympathetic to the Theban exiles’ cause and willing to support their efforts to return to power.
A crucial opportunity arose when Phillidas, secretary to the pro-Spartan Theban polemarchs, secretly contacted the exiles in Athens. Phillidas, an old friend of the exile Melon, revealed the existence of anti-Spartan sentiment within Thebes and the possibility of a coup. While Diodorus suggests Athenian state-sponsored support for the exiles from the outset, Xenophon’s account, corroborated by the cautious policies of Callistratus’ Athens, points to a more nuanced scenario.
It was likely Athenian imperialists, acting independently, who offered initial support. Two Athenian generals, positioned near the border, may have provided discreet assistance, ready to intervene if the Theban coup showed promise. Plutarch’s detail of the exiles using a letter, purportedly from Callistratus, to gain entry to Leontiades’ house is telling. Whether genuine or fabricated, the letter’s mention suggests Callistratus’ perceived pro-Spartan stance was well-known, even if he himself was not directly involved in this particular intrigue.
The Theban exiles’ operation was audacious and successful. They infiltrated Thebes, assassinated Leontiades and other pro-Spartan leaders, and rallied popular support. Only then, with the coup underway, did they summon the Athenian volunteers waiting at the border. This cautious, opportunistic approach aligns with the political realities of Athens at the time. Had the coup failed, Athens could plausibly deny official involvement. Success, however, offered the prospect of a valuable anti-Spartan ally in Thebes, potentially shifting the balance of power in Greece.
Diverging Accounts: Xenophon vs. Diodorus
At this juncture, the narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus diverge significantly. Diodorus claims that the besieged Spartan garrison in the Cadmeia immediately appealed to Sparta for help, and the Thebans, anticipating a swift Spartan response, formally requested Athenian military assistance. According to Diodorus, Athens promptly dispatched a substantial force under Demophon, leading to the Spartans’ surrender due to dwindling supplies and the arrival of the Athenian relief force. A Spartan relief army, Diodorus adds, arrived too late.
Xenophon presents a different picture. He recounts the Spartan harmost seeking aid from nearby Plataea and Thespiae, not Sparta itself. The Thebans, aided by Athenian volunteers, then besieged the Cadmeia. Faced with this pressure, the Spartan garrison negotiated a withdrawal. As the Spartans evacuated, Xenophon notes, the Thebans, disregarding Athenian pleas for restraint, attacked and killed suspected pro-Spartan collaborators within the retreating ranks. Sparta later executed the harmost for prematurely surrendering and mobilized its forces against Thebes.
Xenophon’s account is more convincing. Diodorus’ portrayal of a rapid Athenian commitment of 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry seems improbable given the cautious political climate in Athens and the pro-Spartan leanings of Callistratus’ faction. It is more likely, as Xenophon suggests, that Athenian involvement initially remained unofficial and limited. The Athenian generals near the border likely acted on their own initiative, gauging the situation before committing significant resources.
The Athenian volunteers’ intervention, even if unofficial, proved crucial for the Theban success. However, it is unlikely Athens, under Callistratus’ leadership, would have been eager to provoke Sparta into a full-scale war at this point. The Athenian generals, in assisting the Theban coup, were likely motivated by personal ambition and imperialist leanings, hoping to gain political capital at home by exploiting Sparta’s vulnerability. Their actions were a gamble, not yet a fully endorsed Athenian policy.
The Theban exiles, having successfully seized power, likely hoped for a period of consolidation before a major Spartan reaction. They understood Sparta was internally divided and Agesilaus might face opposition to a large-scale punitive expedition. This breathing space would allow Thebes to solidify its position and potentially forge alliances. Diodorus’ compressed narrative overlooks this crucial period of uncertainty and political maneuvering.
Upon their return to Athens, the Athenian volunteers likely faced a mixed reception. While celebrated by imperialists, their unauthorized intervention likely caused concern among conservatives. For a brief period, Athens maintained a precarious neutrality, awaiting Sparta’s response while Thebes braced for retaliation. The next move, and the decisive shift in Athenian policy, rested with Sparta.
Spartan Divisions: Cleombrotus’ Hesitation and Sphodrias’ Raid
News of the anti-Spartan coup in Thebes deeply troubled Sparta. A resurgent, hostile Thebes, potentially allied with Athens, posed a significant threat. Sparta understood a firm response was necessary. Thebes, anticipating Spartan retaliation, dispatched ambassadors to Sparta seeking peace terms. Isocrates, writing later, portrays this embassy as a sign of Theban “perfidy,” claiming they offered to revert to their pro-Spartan alignment. However, this is likely a distortion, reflecting Athenian anti-Theban sentiment in the 370s BC.
The Theban embassy likely sought to de-escalate tensions, assuring Sparta of Thebes’ peaceful intentions and hoping to avert war. They may have hoped to exploit divisions within Sparta, appealing to factions opposed to Agesilaus’ aggressive policies. If so, they were quickly disappointed. Agesilaus, still dominant, persuaded the Spartan ephors to adopt a hard line. Sparta demanded the Thebans reinstate the pro-Spartan oligarchs and expel the returning exiles – terms utterly unacceptable to the new Theban government. War became inevitable.
Choosing a commander for the Spartan expedition to Thebes became a politically charged decision. Years earlier, the choice between Agesilaus and Agesipolis to lead against Mantineia reflected underlying tensions between aggressive and conciliatory Spartan policies. Now, facing Thebes, this division resurfaced. Agesilaus, the architect of the hardline policy that had arguably backfired, was politically vulnerable. His opponents, likely including supporters of the late King Agesipolis and his brother Cleombrotus, could criticize his aggressive approach as counterproductive.
Appointing Cleombrotus to command the Theban expedition was a politically astute move by Agesilaus. It neutralized a potential rival, diverting opposition while retaining control. If Cleombrotus succeeded, it would validate Agesilaus’ policy. Failure, however, would discredit Cleombrotus, paving the way for Agesilaus to step in and reclaim leadership. Agesilaus, feigning reluctance due to age, strategically maneuvered to let Cleombrotus take command, while remaining in Sparta to manage the political fallout.
Xenophon subtly confirms the political undercurrents. He notes Agesilaus’ stated reason for declining command – age – was a pretext. The real reason, Xenophon implies, was political calculation. Agesilaus understood his command might be perceived as self-serving, aimed at bolstering pro-Spartan tyrannies. By delegating command to Cleombrotus, Agesilaus shifted potential blame while retaining ultimate control.
Cleombrotus, eager to prove himself, likely saw the Theban command as an opportunity. He may have believed he could pursue a more conciliatory approach, aligning with the faction traditionally supported by his family. Compromise and diplomacy, in the mold of his father Pausanias and brother Agesipolis, might secure Spartan interests without escalating the conflict. This strategy, if successful, could enhance Cleombrotus’ standing and shift Spartan policy away from Agesilaus’ hardline approach.
Cleombrotus led his army into Boeotia, bypassing Athenian forces guarding the border. The Athenians, understandably apprehensive, sought to avoid confrontation. Cleombrotus advanced through pro-Spartan Plataea and Thespiae, halting at Cynoscephalae. For sixteen days, he remained there, inactive, puzzling his troops. He then ordered a retreat, having achieved nothing against Thebes.
Cleombrotus’ inaction is best explained by his political calculations. He likely hoped the new Theban regime, potentially receptive to a less confrontational Spartan approach, would initiate negotiations. A purely military solution would only reinforce Agesilaus’ policies. Cleombrotus, perhaps believing Agesilaus’ aggressive policies were detrimental to Sparta, may have sought a diplomatic path to establish a more stable, less confrontational relationship with Thebes.
His hopes for negotiation dashed, Cleombrotus faced a dilemma. Attacking Thebes would serve Agesilaus’ agenda. Returning to Sparta empty-handed risked political damage. In a desperate gamble, Cleombrotus devised a daring plan. He left a substantial force and funds under the command of Sphodrias at Thespiae, instructing him to undertake a surprise attack on the Piraeus, Athens’ port. This audacious move, unauthorized and politically risky, aimed to dramatically alter the strategic landscape and salvage Cleombrotus’ reputation.
Sphodrias’ Raid: A Calculated Gamble
The circumstances surrounding Sphodrias’ raid remain debated. Xenophon, in a transparent attempt to absolve Sparta, absurdly claims the Thebans bribed Sphodrias to attack Athens, hoping to embroil Athens and Sparta in war. This explanation strains credulity, especially considering the resources Cleombrotus entrusted to Sphodrias.
Diodorus offers a more plausible account, attributing the raid to Cleombrotus’ instigation, acting without ephor approval. Plutarch confirms Sphodrias belonged to a faction opposed to Agesilaus. This aligns with the political dynamics of Sparta: Sphodrias, not a conservative nor an Agesilaus loyalist, likely belonged to a third faction, perhaps linked to the legacy of the late admiral Lysander.
Cleombrotus’ motive for ordering the Piraeus raid was likely political desperation. His failed Theban campaign threatened his standing in Sparta. A successful strike against Athens, mirroring Phoebidas’ seizure of the Cadmeia, could dramatically shift the balance of power, eclipsing Agesilaus and establishing Cleombrotus as a dominant force. Neutralizing Athens, a potential ally of Thebes, was key to this strategy.
Cleombrotus likely calculated the political risks. His conservative supporters might be alarmed, but unlikely to abandon the son of Pausanias. Agesilaus’ faction would be angered, but a successful coup, mirroring their own Theban intervention, would be difficult to openly condemn. Crucially, a bold strike against Athens would appeal to Lysander’s old supporters, who had long advocated for Spartan dominance in the Aegean and the neutralization of Athenian naval power.
By ordering Sphodrias’ raid, Cleombrotus aimed to achieve multiple objectives: redeem his reputation, gain support from Lysander’s faction, and potentially seize control of Spartan policy. It was a high-stakes gamble, but one born of political necessity. While some scholars dismiss the Piraeus raid as logistically improbable, Xenophon suggests Sphodrias took considerable care in planning the operation. The raid’s failure, likely due to unforeseen delays during the night march, does not negate its strategic intent or political motivations.
Sphodrias’ forces marched towards the Piraeus under cover of darkness but failed to reach their target before dawn. They engaged in some minor plundering before retreating. Adding further intrigue, Xenophon notes Spartan ambassadors, including Agesilaus’ confidante Etymocles, were present in Athens at the time of the raid. The Athenians, understandably suspicious, arrested them.
The Spartan ambassadors, genuinely surprised, protested their innocence, arguing their presence in Athens, especially at their proxenos‘s house (a likely place to search), would be illogical if they were involved in a plot. They assured the Athenians the Spartan government was not complicit and Sphodrias would be punished. Initially, the Athenians, though deeply angered, remained open to explanations, releasing the ambassadors based on their assurances of Spartan accountability. The Athenians, particularly Callistratus’ faction, still hoped for a peaceful resolution and Spartan accountability.
The ephors recalled Sphodrias for trial. The outcome of this trial became a political flashpoint, determining the direction of Athenian and Spartan policy, and the fate of factions within both cities. Peace or war hung in the balance.
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Athenian Restraint and the Trial of the Generals
The Sphodrias raid ignited fury and alarm in Athens. Despite Athens’ peaceful posture and recent conciliatory gestures, Sparta had launched an unprovoked attack on their vital port. This act threatened to shatter Callistratus’ pro-Spartan policy and empower Athenian imperialists advocating for a more assertive stance.
Callistratus, however, likely urged restraint. He could argue Sphodrias’ actions were unauthorized and would be condemned by Sparta. Turning against Sparta prematurely, he might contend, would be a mistake. Athens should await the outcome of Sphodrias’ trial. Conviction would vindicate Spartan good faith; acquittal would necessitate a reassessment.
Callistratus, perhaps reassured by the departing Spartan ambassadors, likely believed Sphodrias, a known political opponent of Agesilaus, would be punished. He likely persuaded Athenians to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Meanwhile, Athens took defensive measures, dispatching Chabrias and peltasts to guard the border, a precautionary step without being overtly hostile.
Agesilaus’ Calculation: Acquittal and War
News of Sphodrias’ failed raid reached Sparta, prompting the ephors to recall him for trial on capital charges. Sphodrias, fearing condemnation, particularly from Agesilaus, did not appear. Agesilaus, initially inclined to punish Sphodrias to appease Athens, ultimately shifted course. Xenophon’s account of Cleonymus, Sphodrias’ son, pleading with Agesilaus’ son Archidamus, who then interceded with Agesilaus, offers a glimpse into this political maneuver.
Xenophon’s narrative, while sentimentalized, reveals the complex factional landscape within Sparta. He highlights three groups: conservatives, Agesilaus’ faction, and Cleombrotus’ faction. Conservatives favored Peloponnesian focus; Agesilaus sought mainland Greek dominance while maintaining Athenian neutrality; Cleombrotus, after the Piraeus raid, leaned towards a more expansive Aegean policy, potentially at Athens’ expense.
Agesilaus initially intended to condemn Sphodrias, likely to appease Athens and maintain his policy of Athenian neutrality. However, political calculations intervened. He likely realized Athenian goodwill was unlikely, regardless of Sphodrias’ fate. The Athenians’ harsh treatment of Spartan ambassadors hinted at deep-seated mistrust. Condemning Sphodrias, moreover, risked alienating Cleombrotus’ faction and the conservatives, potentially uniting opposition against Agesilaus at a critical juncture, with war looming.
Agesilaus, facing internal political pressures and uncertain Athenian reaction, opted for a calculated acquittal. By publicly acknowledging Sphodrias’ “wrongdoing” while emphasizing his past service and Sparta’s need for such soldiers, Agesilaus offered a thinly veiled justification for leniency. This maneuver aimed to divide Cleombrotus’ faction, secure support for continued leadership, and pave the way for war against both Thebes and Athens, under his command.
Agesilaus’ gamble paid off. Sparta, despite Sphodrias’ transgression, mobilized against Thebes, re-appointing Agesilaus as commander. Agesilaus, through political maneuvering, had consolidated his position, securing a mandate for war and marginalizing Cleombrotus. However, in choosing political expediency over justice and peace, Sparta effectively shattered the Peace of Antalcidas, setting Greece on a path to renewed conflict.
Athenian Fury and the Second Athenian League
Sphodrias’ acquittal extinguished any remaining hope for peaceful relations between Athens and Sparta. Outrage swept through Athens. Callistratus’ pro-Spartan policy lay in ruins. Athenian imperialists seized the moment, advocating for war and alliance with Thebes. The Athenians, finally convinced of Spartan treachery, voted for war.
The pro-Theban faction, now ascendant, spearheaded war preparations. Athens fortified the Piraeus, initiated shipbuilding, and actively sought alliance with Thebes. It is at this point Diodorus’ account of Demophon’s expedition finds its correct chronological place. Athens, now officially committed to supporting Thebes, dispatched Demophon with a substantial force, not to initiate the Theban coup, but to solidify the newly forged alliance and prepare for war against Sparta.
Diodorus, while chronologically misplaced on Demophon’s expedition, accurately portrays the Athenians’ motivations: repaying Theban support during the Thirty Tyrants’ rule and securing a vital ally against Spartan land power. The Peloponnesian War’s outcome might have differed, Athenians recognized, had Thebes been their ally, not Sparta’s.
Diodorus also correctly links the Sphodrias affair to the formation of the Second Athenian League. With war against Sparta imminent, Athens actively sought allies. Emissaries were dispatched to cities chafing under Spartan rule, urging them to join a new alliance for “liberty.” Chios and Byzantium were among the first to respond, followed by Rhodes, Mytilene, and other Aegean states.
The Athenian democracy, buoyed by this support, established the Second Athenian Sea League. Diodorus highlights its key features: a common council in Athens with equal representation for all member states, regardless of size, and a commitment to allied autonomy, with Athens as “leader,” not master. This structure aimed to avoid the pitfalls of the Fifth-Century Delian League and address allied concerns about Athenian imperialism.
Diodorus, however, misplaces the League’s formation too early, linking it directly to the Theban coup. In reality, the League emerged in the spring of 378 BC, after Sphodrias’ acquittal, as a direct response to the escalating conflict with Sparta and the need for a broad anti-Spartan coalition. Thebes, preoccupied with its land war against Sparta, initially hesitated to join a naval league. However, Athenian diplomatic efforts, recognizing Theban strategic importance, eventually secured Theban membership, albeit on terms reflecting Thebes’ primarily land-based focus.
Diodorus’ account of Athenian war preparations, including a large-scale mobilization and the recall of cleruchs, further underscores Athens’ commitment to the new anti-Spartan alliance. The generals for 378/7 BC – Timotheus, Chabrias, and Callistratus – reflect this shift. While Callistratus remained, his influence was now primarily financial, with imperialists like Timotheus and Chabrias driving Athenian policy.
The year 379/8 BC, therefore, marked a decisive turning point. Sphodrias’ raid and subsequent acquittal shattered the fragile peace, triggering a chain reaction that reshaped the Greek political landscape. Callistratus’ pro-Spartan faction lost control in Athens, replaced by imperialists forging a new alliance with Thebes and other anti-Spartan states. The Peace of Antalcidas, designed to maintain Spartan hegemony, lay in ruins. Greece plunged into a new era of conflict, with Athens and Sparta once again locked in a struggle for dominance, a struggle that would ultimately weaken both powers and pave the way for new forces to emerge on the Greek stage.
