The Taiwan Strait, with its high-stakes standoff between the U.S., China, and Taiwan, has become one of the world’s most precarious flashpoints. Over recent years, Beijing’s military maneuvers around Taiwan have escalated dramatically in response to what it sees as increasing provocations from Taipei and Washington. Taiwan has countered by ramping up its defense spending and preparedness, while the U.S. has heightened its military presence and diplomatic overtures in the region.
In the midst of these tensions, however, James B. Steinberg, former Deputy Secretary of State, argues that the U.S. strategy of “strategic ambiguity” could still be the best path forward. His view diverges from the recent calls for clear, unambiguous commitments to Taiwan’s defense, emphasizing that the United States’ decades-long approach has managed to keep the peace precisely because it leaves key questions unanswered. Here’s a look at how ambiguity became a U.S. strategy for Taiwan and why it remains a powerful tool.
How the U.S. stumbled into its Taiwan policy
The story of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations is riddled with missed opportunities and conflicting interests. Steinberg highlights that the U.S. approach to Taiwan has historically been marked more by indecision and tactical ambiguity than by any grand strategy. Starting as early as the 1943 Cairo Conference, the United States has shifted between promises and concessions that have left Taiwan’s political future unresolved.
After World War II, the U.S. handed Taiwan back to China, then led by Chiang Kai-shek, rather than establishing it as a separate entity. The emergence of Mao Zedong’s Communist China and the Korean War further complicated matters, prompting the U.S. to adopt a policy of military support for Taiwan, while still refraining from formally recognizing it as a sovereign nation. This ambiguous stance, formalized by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, continues to guide U.S. policy. This act declares that the U.S. will treat any non-peaceful effort to resolve Taiwan’s status as a matter of “grave concern” but stops short of guaranteeing military intervention.
This “strategic ambiguity” has frustrated those who believe the U.S. should either formally recognize Taiwan as an independent nation or fully endorse Beijing’s claims. But ambiguity has allowed the U.S. to avoid provoking Beijing directly, supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence without committing to defend it unconditionally.
Strategic ambiguity’s success
Despite its frustratingly uncertain nature, strategic ambiguity has kept Taiwan secure and prevented a full-scale military clash in the region. By keeping China guessing about how it might respond to a Taiwan crisis, the U.S. has created an atmosphere where neither side can be sure of the outcome of aggressive actions. This ambiguity deters China from initiating force against Taiwan while encouraging Taiwan to avoid pushing too hard for formal independence.
Steinberg references a notable instance during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis when the U.S. responded to Chinese missile tests by deploying two aircraft carriers near Taiwan—stopping short of the Strait to avoid direct provocation. This carefully calibrated move demonstrated U.S. resolve without locking it into any absolute commitments. It effectively deterred further aggression while reassuring Taiwan of U.S. support. It’s a balance that has allowed Taiwan to prosper under the threat of Chinese aggression, transforming itself into a democratic and economically advanced society despite its ambiguous political status.
The cost of clarity
Advocates of a more explicit policy argue that strategic ambiguity has run its course and that only a clear commitment to Taiwan’s defense can deter China’s growing military might. But Steinberg cautions that this could be a risky overcorrection. A strong, unequivocal U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan could corner Beijing, making it feel that reunification through peaceful means is slipping away. Faced with the reality that Taiwan’s independence might soon be backed by an official U.S. commitment, Chinese leaders might choose to act preemptively rather than wait.
On the other hand, too bold a move toward Taiwanese independence by the U.S. could embolden Taiwanese leaders to cross red lines, pushing the limits of China’s tolerance. This confidence in an American security umbrella could lead Taiwan to assert independence more forcefully, increasing the likelihood of triggering a Chinese military response. Thus, strategic ambiguity serves as a buffer, preventing either side from miscalculating their own strength or resolve.
Keeping peace through “structured ambiguity”
Steinberg advocates for a continuation of strategic ambiguity but with added “guardrails” that clarify certain boundaries for both the U.S. and China. For instance, the U.S. could establish mutually acceptable boundaries for military exercises, such as maintaining the airspace buffer along the Taiwan Strait median line. Similarly, it could reinforce policies that discourage unilateral changes to Taiwan’s status from either Beijing or Taipei.
One critical element of this approach involves supporting Taiwan’s military deterrence without direct promises of intervention. By providing Taiwan with defensive capabilities—such as air defenses, missile systems, and surveillance tools—the U.S. can help make the island a “porcupine,” difficult and costly for China to attack. This would reinforce deterrence without altering the status quo, signaling to China that an attack would be costly even without a guaranteed American military response.
Pragmatic steps forward
Steinberg underscores that successful ambiguity also requires diplomacy, including fostering communication channels between Beijing and Taipei. While direct negotiations between Taiwan and China have been stalled for years, small gestures like mutual recognition of flight paths or economic exchanges could help lower the stakes. Additionally, international cooperation could be expanded to include Taiwan in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite, such as the World Health Organization. This would allow Taiwan greater international engagement without provoking Beijing.
Another pragmatic step is encouraging China to ease its insistence on Taiwan’s isolation. For instance, Beijing previously accepted Taiwan as an observer in global organizations, including the World Health Assembly and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Restoring such forms of participation would reduce Taiwan’s sense of isolation while showing the world that Beijing is open to constructive solutions, rather than pure coercion.
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The long game
Steinberg argues that patience, rather than drastic policy shifts, could ultimately serve U.S. and Taiwanese interests best. For decades, China’s leaders believed that growing economic ties with Taiwan would make reunification attractive. Similarly, Washington hoped that as Taiwan’s democracy developed, the Chinese government would be less inclined to jeopardize these gains through military force. Now, with nationalism on the rise and military tensions escalating, both sides feel that time is working against them.
Yet, by maintaining ambiguity and encouraging both sides to defer the final status question, the U.S. could keep the door open for peaceful resolution. Allowing Taiwan to flourish economically and diplomatically without direct confrontation buys time for both sides to de-escalate and reconsider extreme positions. This patience doesn’t offer a quick or easy answer, but it’s a strategy that has historically allowed Taiwan to grow without risking catastrophe.
Conclusion
Steinberg’s perspective suggests that strategic ambiguity, while imperfect, remains the best option for managing U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. Clear-cut commitments or policy shifts could push both China and Taiwan into rigid positions that heighten the risk of war. Ambiguity allows each side to claim enough support to avoid feeling pressured into irreversible actions, preserving peace by creating space for diplomacy, restraint, and pragmatism.
In a world of escalating tensions and fast-changing power dynamics, ambiguity gives the U.S., China, and Taiwan the flexibility to adapt and respond to each other without sparking open conflict. For now, rather than rushing toward resolution, embracing patience and strategic ambiguity may be the wisest—and safest—approach to managing one of the most dangerous flashpoints on the planet.
