The Battle of Gazala, which took place in Libya from May to June 1942, was a major win for the German and Italian troops under General Erwin Rommel against the British, Commonwealth, and Free French forces during the Western Desert Campaigns that ran from June 1940 to January 1943 in World War II. Because of this defeat and the collapse of the British defense at Gazala, the Allies had to give up the important port of Tobruk, marking one of Rommel’s greatest victories.
Desert Warfare
In the second year of WWII, the Allies—mainly British and Commonwealth troops—were really focused on keeping the Suez Canal safe from the Axis powers, which included Germany and Italy. North Africa was super important for both sides because they wanted to control key shipping routes in the Mediterranean. Malta played a big role too, and holding onto that island fortress (which was under British control) was crucial for securing airfields in the North African desert. Plus, North Africa was pretty much the only place where Britain could take on Germany and Italy on land, hoping to score some victories that would lift the spirits of the British people after the Dunkirk Evacuation and the London Blitz.
Because of all this, a bunch of battles broke out in the desert, known as the Western Desert Campaigns. At first, the British Army faced off against poorly equipped Italian forces, but soon enough, German troops joined in with better gear, weapons, and training.
Fighting in North Africa was tough due to its small ports, bad roads, and harsh desert conditions. For both sides, dealing with local challenges and logistics issues became just as important as defeating the enemy. As Rommel famously said, “The battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins.”
One thing the desert had plenty of was space, so battles could stretch over miles. Here, gaining territory mattered less than causing damage to the enemy. Another unique aspect of desert warfare was the lack of civilian involvement, and both sides often used captured equipment. This made it tricky to identify who was approaching through the dust and sand. Those same dust clouds and the fast-paced armored fights meant that the air forces on both sides could only do so much during battles, mostly targeting supply lines or fixed positions.
The Desert Fox
Lieutenant-General Rommel was all about fast, mobile warfare with tanks. He really showed what he could do as the head of a panzer division during the Fall of France earlier in the war. When he took charge of the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) in January 1941, he brought those same tactics to the Western Desert of North Africa. It’s no surprise that the Afrika Korps had the battle cry Heia Safari, which means “Let’s go get ’em” in Swahili.
Rommel had a unique approach to using tanks. Instead of just sending his armored vehicles to take out enemy tanks like most commanders did, he first sent in forces with anti-tank guns to disable as many enemy tanks as possible. Once they were taken care of, he unleashed his own tanks on the now-vulnerable infantry. He really prioritized speed and boldness, which threw off the more cautious Allied commanders who usually waited until they had a huge advantage before making a move.
In March 1941, Rommel captured El Agheila and then Mersa Brega on April 1. By July, he was practically in charge of all German and Italian forces in North Africa, even though he still had to answer to the Italian high command. He was quickly becoming known as a major threat to the Allies and earned the nickname “the Desert Fox.” He scored two victories against Allied offensives in May and June, called Brevity and Battleaxe, but faced a setback in November during the Crusader offensive. His main issues were not having enough troops and lacking supplies like food, fuel, and ammo.
However, by January 1942, things started looking up, and despite being told to focus on defense, he decided to go back on the attack.Rommel’s main opponents were the British and Commonwealth Eighth Army, led by Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie during the early summer of 1942. The overall head of Allied forces in the Middle East was General Claude Auchinleck. At this point in the Western Desert Campaigns, the British Army was struggling with coordination among its infantry, artillery, and armored divisions. Plus, their reinforcements didn’t match the skill level of the seasoned desert troops. They faced issues like a lack of battle drills, outdated tanks like the Crusader and Matilda, weak anti-tank guns, and a clunky command structure that really held them back. On the flip side, Rommel had fewer soldiers, but his troops were more experienced, better organized, and worked well together.
The Gazala Line
Tobruk was super important for any army looking to push into Egypt, and Rommel made three unsuccessful tries to capture the port, which was well defended by two Australian brigades. The Brevity and Battleaxe offensives didn’t manage to lift the siege on Tobruk, and after the Australians were ordered to pull back by their government, British troops took over, including the 2nd South African Division and a Polish brigade.
Finally, in December 1941, the Crusader offensive broke the siege, but Rommel was still keen on getting his hands on this key logistics spot. He quickly regained almost half the territory he lost during the Crusader offensive and then focused on the Allied defenses at Gazala, about 64 km (40 miles) west of Tobruk. Attacking the Eighth Army would also preempt a British counter-offensive aimed at pushing Rommel back ahead of major Allied landings planned for the next November. Both sides had a good idea of what the other was planning thanks to military intel (and the obvious troop buildup at Gazala), but Rommel’s habit of saying one thing to his superiors and doing another kept the British guessing about his true intentions.
The Gazala Line was made up of static defenses with isolated strongpoints, each manned by a brigade, and tanks scattered in between. Each strongpoint was further protected by barbed wire, trenches, and extensive minefields. This line stretched from Gazala to Bir Hakeim, a remote outpost that was basically just a crumbling fortress and a desert well. It was set up to defend both the western approach to Tobruk and the Via Balbia road through Libya. There weren’t any real fortifications along the line; most strongpoints were meant to serve as staging areas for launching planned offensives.
They couldn’t support each other since they were too far apart, so they were designed to hold off the enemy until mobile armored units could come to the rescue. Like many defensive setups, the weakest spots on the Gazala Line were its flanks. Rommel’s Operation Venezia aimed to take advantage of these vulnerabilities. The Eighth Army had the numbers, especially in operational tanks—849 compared to Rommel’s 560—but this edge was less effective because they had to spread their armor, troops, and artillery across a long defensive line.
Rommel Attacks
The Battle of Gazala kicked off on May 26, 1942. Rommel sent his Italian troops to hit the southern stronghold of the Allied lines at Bir Hakeim, which was defended by the 1st Free French Brigade led by Major General Marie Pierre Koenig. This brigade included two battalions from the famous French Foreign Legion and colonial troops from Chad and Congo.
Rommel had his armored forces move in a curve to strike the enemy from behind while the Italians launched a frontal assault on the Gazala Line up north. This was mainly a distraction to draw in as many Allied tanks as possible, weakening the defenses against Rommel in the south. To make it look like the main Axis attack was happening up north, Rommel staged a fake advance with one of his armored units and even had trucks loaded with aircraft engines drive around to kick up dust.
The surprise night attack in the south started off strong, with Axis forces racing about 40 to 50 kilometers (25-30 miles) toward their targets. But the defenses were tougher than Rommel expected, and the British had new Grant tanks that were way more effective. The Allies got wind of Rommel’s moves thanks to a South African armored car unit that had been tailing him since the beginning. The tricky part for the Allies was figuring out which attack was the real deal and which was just a ruse. By morning, it became clear that the southern push had most of the Axis armor.
After some intense tank battles and running low on fuel and ammo, Rommel pulled back on May 29. He wrote in his diary that their plan to take out the British forces behind the Gazala Line didn’t go as planned because the enemy was tougher than they thought (Ford, 42). Ritchie figured Rommel was completely backing off and didn’t rush to send troops after the Axis forces, which were now hanging out at a spot called the Cauldron, right in the middle of the battlefield but outside the minefields. The British commanders hesitated, thinking they had Rommel trapped, so they didn’t feel the need to act quickly. Meanwhile, Rommel was safe behind his strong 88-mm artillery on one side and the enemy’s minefields on the other, plus some mines he had laid himself.
Rommel got a chance to regroup when two Italian motorized divisions cleared paths through two minefields and captured key Allied positions at Sidi Muftah and Dahar el Aslag. Refreshed and ready, Rommel’s forces pushed back a poorly organized British attack on the Cauldron on June 5, then launched their own counteroffensive. He also ramped up the assault on Bir Hakeim, reinforcing the Italians with a German Panzer battlegroup and sending in air support with 54 fighter planes and 45 bombers. Despite fierce resistance from the French, they finally took the position on June 10, but not before 2,700 out of the original 3,600 defenders managed to escape. The Battle of Bir Hakeim became legendary.
Next, Rommel hit the British from behind, causing heavy losses and taking over the central stronghold known as Knightsbridge on the night of June 12. The Eighth Army lost over 140 tanks in just a day. On June 14, worried about losing their supplies, the British had to destroy their major supply dump at Belhamed, which held 5.7 million liters of fuel. The British command and the entire Eighth Army were in disarray. They had three Allied divisions sitting unused, which was a huge waste of resources, allowing Rommel to pick off enemy units even though he was outnumbered overall.
The Gazala Line was pretty much done for after getting smashed in two spots, and the British armor was taking heavy hits. With Rommel scoring more wins against scattered Allied troops, he had a clear path to Tobruk. The Battle of Gazala wrapped up on June 17. Historian T. Moreman pointed out that:
The Eighth Army got outsmarted and outmaneuvered by the Axis forces during three tough weeks… Ritchie and the British high command basically wasted the advantages they had at the start of the battle. (75)
Lieutenant General Francis Tucker, who led the 4th Indian Division, called the defeat at Gazala one of the worst moments in British Army history (Mitchellhill-Green, 271).
Rommel surrounded Tobruk on June 17 and, with solid air support, took the port on June 21 by hitting the least expected part of the defenses. Most of Tobruk’s defenses had already been stripped down for the Gazala Line. The garrison surrendered, leading to 33,000 men becoming POWs. This was the biggest surrender for the British Army in WWII, aside from Singapore. Losing the port handed over a ton of valuable supplies to Rommel, along with half of his army’s transport vehicles. He then scored another win at the Battle of Mersa Matruh, taking the Egyptian port on June 28. The Eighth Army, despite losing 50,000 men but still being a strong force, retreated behind the defensive line at El Alamein, further east along the Egyptian coast.
Aftermath
After capturing Tobruk, Rommel was riding high in his career. At 49, he got promoted to Generalfeldmarschall (field marshal), making him the youngest to hold that title in the German army at the time. He pushed the British Army out of Libya and back into Egypt, aiming to snag Alexandria and the Suez Canal—two big wins that could change the course of the war. But once again, Rommel faced his old issue: a lack of supplies and materials, which gave the British an edge. They took full advantage during the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942 and the Battle of Alam Halfa the following August. The British forces had solid air support from a beefed-up Western Desert Air Force, allowing their fighter and medium bomber squadrons to operate closer to home. Meanwhile, Rommel’s air support dwindled as he moved east, and his supply lines were stretched thin.
Adding to the mix, the British Eighth Army got a new commander in August 1942—General Bernard Montgomery. He revitalized the troops, earning them the nickname “Desert Rats,” originally given to the 7th Armoured Division. Montgomery did a much better job of coordinating artillery, infantry, and armored divisions, leading to a heavy defeat for Rommel at the Second Battle of El Alamein in October-November. Even though Rommel lost around 30,000 men as prisoners, he managed to retreat and live to fight another day. Eventually, the Allies recaptured Tobruk.In November 1942, three new Allied forces, including the Western Task Force led by General George Patton, landed in North Africa and started moving east. By January 1943, Montgomery had taken Tripoli.
Rommel realized he was in a tough spot because the Allies had way more troops and better supplies, but when he suggested to the German high command that they should pull out of North Africa, they ignored him. He pulled his troops back to Tunisia but was told to keep fighting in the desert as best he could. The Allies faced some setbacks, like getting beaten at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943. However, the British Eighth Army bounced back and won the Battle of Medinine on March 6, 1943. By then, Rommel was pretty sick and headed back to Germany in March 1943, marking the end of his time fighting in Africa. In the end, the Desert Fox was defeated by the Desert Rats. By May 1943, the combined efforts of Allied ground and air forces, along with naval blockades of important ports, pushed the Axis powers out of North Africa.
