The map of global governance is being redrawn in real time. Less than a year into his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has ruptured decades-old alliances, torn up treaties, and cast doubt on the very logic of collective security. For many observers it feels as if the scaffolding erected after World War II is crumbling. Yet history suggests the end of one order can also be the beginning of another—provided the states that still value cooperation move quickly and in concert.
🛑 The Trump Shock to the Post-1945 Order
From the first morning of Inauguration Day 2025, the United States began a head-spinning retreat. Paris climate accord? Gone. World Health Organization? Left. NATO commitments? Re-interpreted on the fly. By February, an executive review of every treaty to which Washington is party signaled that nothing—whether the IMF or the World Bank—was beyond the chopping block.
Allies reacted with alarm. European leaders whispered about a continental nuclear deterrent. Tokyo dusted off debates last heard during the 1950s. For scholars of “hegemonic stability theory,” the script seemed clear: remove the stabilizing hegemon and the system collapses into 1930s-style chaos.
But that theory focuses on the supply of order—the willingness and capacity of one great power to underwrite cooperation. It tells us far less about the demand for order that comes from the 190-plus non-hegemonic states that dislike living in a diplomatic jungle.
🧩 Beyond Hegemonic Stability: Supply Meets Demand
Even before the American superpower was born, states had crafted collective rules. The thirteenth-century Hanseatic League protected trade from Novgorod to London. The Concert of Europe, forged at Vienna in 1815, kept relative peace for a century without a single dominant ruler.
Demand-driven cooperation has persisted during the U.S. era, too: the European Union welded rivals into a single market; OPEC pooled petro-clout among states that share little else; BRICS+ created its own development bank to sidestep Western ceilings. Each shows that when interests align, countries can write rules together—even in the shadow of distrust.
🤝 Europe’s Moment
Nowhere is the need—and the ability—to step up clearer than in Europe. Taken together, EU countries already provide more than half of the World Bank’s International Development Association funding. They field sophisticated militaries, command the world’s second-largest currency zone, and anchor the globe’s tightest web of regulatory standards.
If Washington freezes troop levels or aid budgets, Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and Rome cannot afford a wait-and-see posture. Rapid moves toward deeper defense integration—building on the fledgling European Sky Shield and Permanent Structured Cooperation initiatives—would signal resolve. Equally vital is political will: a standing European Security Council, including the United Kingdom, could coordinate responses to crises from the Sahel to the South China Sea.
💰 Development Finance Without Washington
The IDA is the world’s most effective poverty-reduction machine, turning one donor dollar into nearly four dollars of concessional loans. Yet the United States, long the loudest voice, provides less than 15 percent of its capital. If the money stops, the rest of the board can—and should—fill the gap on two conditions:
- Weighted voice for weighted wallets. Europe, Japan, and China would claim the voting shares their cheques justify, correcting decades of imbalance.
- Geographic re-balance of power. Charter rules require World Bank headquarters to sit in the territory of the largest shareholder. If the U.S. leaves, Tokyo could host the Bank, with major operational hubs in São Paulo, Nairobi, and Beijing—placing lenders nearer to borrowers.
Such a shake-up would hurt Washington’s prestige but strengthen the institution by anchoring it in a broader coalition.
🏦 Reinventing the IMF and Regional Safety Nets
Unlike the World Bank, the IMF is valuable to Washington: its quotas yield handsome profits and policy leverage. Should U.S. contributions wane—or conditions harden—others need not stand idle.
- Thick currency cushions: Global reserves have multiplied ten-fold since 1990, and just 57 percent are now held in dollars.
- Swap-line diplomacy: China maintains 40 bilateral lines worth nearly $600 billion; India and Brazil are not far behind.
- Regional fire brigades: From the Chiang Mai Initiative to the European Stability Mechanism and the newly announced African Financial Stability Mechanism, layered funds replicate many IMF functions without Washington’s veto.
A patchwork? Yes—but redundancy is resilience. If the hegemon turns unreliable, a mesh of regional nets can still catch falling economies.
🛡️ Forging New Leadership Forums
Summitry shapes norms as surely as treaties. Yet Trump has frozen out the G-20 and dangled Russia’s readmission to the G-7. Other leaders should not abandon the habit of high-level dialogue; they should adapt it.
Picture a G-12 convened by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom before the U.S. assumes the 2026 G-20 presidency: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey round out a group spanning 60 percent of global GDP—enough weight to steer pandemics, climate finance, and digital rules.
Yes, China’s seat will be controversial, but excluding Beijing would hand rule-writing to Washington and Beijing bilaterally—precisely the scenario most capitals fear.
🔮 A Post-American Multilateralism?
Will China simply replace the United States as hegemon? Not if others refuse to leave any single power unchaperoned. Shared institutions give medium-sized states—from Argentina to Vietnam—leverage they could never wield alone. The task ahead is not to recreate 1945 but to refit multilateralism for a world of multiple giants and many agile middle powers.
That means:
- Locking in rules that outlast situational majorities.
- Funding functions—health surveillance, green finance, crisis lending—that every government ultimately relies on.
- Accepting that leadership will be distributed, with rotating chairs, regional headquarters, and coalitions that blur the old North-South divide.
The alternative is a series of transactional duels in which the strong dictate and the weak duck for cover.
🚀 Conclusion: Seizing the Window
Order is not a gift bestowed by a benevolent superpower; it is a practice—renewed or neglected every day. The Trump administration’s drawbridges-up strategy has jolted the system, but it has also clarified choices for everyone else. Europe, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and a host of pivotal states can shore up the planks Washington is ripping away—if they act quickly and together.
History is clear: when the hegemon retreats, chaos follows only if the rest do nothing. In the coming months, the measure of global statesmanship will be whether capitals from Ottawa to Canberra decide that multilateralism without America is not only possible but indispensable.
