The Peloponnesian War, a brutal and protracted conflict that engulfed ancient Greece in the 5th century BC, remains a subject of intense historical scrutiny. At its heart lies the strategic thinking of Pericles, the Athenian statesman whose influence shaped the early years of the war. Thucydides, the war’s historian, famously lauded Pericles’ strategic foresight, claiming he “realized in advance the power of the city” and that his judgment was vindicated after his death. But was Thucydides’ assessment accurate? Was Pericles’ strategy truly the soundest path for Athens, or were there inherent flaws that ultimately contributed to their defeat?
This post delves into the strategic landscape of the early Peloponnesian War, examining Pericles’ grand design and contrasting it with the often-conflicting strategies employed by Sparta. By analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, and drawing upon the insightful analysis of a scholarly text examining this pivotal period, we can gain a deeper understanding of why Thucydides so firmly championed Pericles’ approach, and whether history ultimately proved him right.
Pericles’ Defensive Masterplan: A Strategy of Attrition
Pericles’ strategy for the war, as outlined by Thucydides in his historical account, was remarkably clear and consistent. He urged the Athenians to avoid pitched land battles against the superior Spartan hoplite army. Instead, he advocated a defensive posture on land, focusing on the strength of Athens’ formidable navy and its control of the sea. This maritime dominance would allow Athens to protect its vital trade routes, supply itself with resources, and harass the Peloponnese through naval raids. Crucially, Pericles emphasized the importance of patience and endurance, believing that Athens’ vast resources and financial reserves would eventually wear down Sparta’s resolve.
This strategy was not without its potential drawbacks. A purely defensive war could be frustrating and demoralizing for the Athenian populace, accustomed to more proactive and glorious military engagements. Furthermore, the financial strain of maintaining a large navy and sustaining the city during prolonged sieges could prove immense. Pericles himself acknowledged the limitations of relying on “forced contributions” to finance a protracted war. The initial large-scale naval expeditions in 431 and 430 were undoubtedly costly, potentially leading to inflation as capital reserves were channeled into sailors’ pay and the city became increasingly reliant on expensive imports. One might even question if such a defensive approach could ever truly lead to a decisive victory, or if it was destined to be a war of attrition with uncertain outcomes.
Despite these potential weaknesses, Thucydides, writing after Pericles’ death, remained steadfast in his praise. To understand this unwavering support, we must turn our attention to the strategic alternatives available to Athens and, more importantly, to the strategic vulnerabilities inherent in Sparta’s position.
Sparta’s Strategic Crossroads: Conventional Invasions vs. Adventurous Gambit
The Spartan approach to the Archidamian War, the first phase of the Peloponnesian War (named after the Spartan King Archidamus II), was far from monolithic. A discernible tension existed between two contrasting strategic philosophies: the “conventional” and the “adventurous.”
The “conventional” Spartan strategy was rooted in their land-based military strength. It revolved around annual invasions of Attica, the region surrounding Athens, aiming to devastate Athenian farmland, provoke a decisive land battle, and ultimately force Athenian submission. This strategy, spearheaded by King Archidamus, was based on the assumption of a swift victory. Spartan confidence was high in 431, fueled by the belief that Athenian resolve would crumble under the pressure of repeated invasions and the destruction of their agricultural base.
However, even from the outset, voices within Sparta advocated for a more “adventurous” approach. The Corinthians, a key Spartan ally, argued for exploiting Athens’ vulnerabilities beyond Attica. They urged Sparta to instigate revolts among Athens’ allies, thereby cutting off the Athenian empire’s vital revenue streams. They also proposed establishing fortified positions within Athenian territory to maintain constant pressure. Furthermore, Sparta entertained ambitious plans to seek alliances with Persia and to build a massive naval fleet, potentially dwarfing the Athenian navy.
While the early years of the Archidamian War saw Sparta primarily adhere to the “conventional” strategy of annual invasions, the “adventurous” elements were never entirely absent. Sparta repeatedly sought Persian aid, and despite initial failures to secure naval support from Sicily and Italy, they did attempt to challenge Athens at sea. In 429, a Spartan fleet under Cnemus launched an attack on Acarnania, and there were even audacious, though ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to strike at the Athenian naval heartland, the Piraeus. The dispatch of a significant Spartan fleet to aid the Mytilenean revolt in 428 and the subsequent intervention in Corcyra further illustrate the pull of the “adventurous” strategy. The foundation of Heraclea in Trachis in 426, while intended to bolster Spartan allies in central Greece, also served as a potential base for operations against Euboea, a crucial Athenian supply line.
Despite these forays into “adventure,” the Spartan war effort before 425 remained largely defined by the “conventional” strategy. This was primarily due to limitations in Spartan naval power, a scarcity of Spartiate soldiers for overseas deployments, and a lingering belief that the annual invasions would eventually break Athenian will. The Athenian appeal for peace in 430, however brief and ultimately rejected, likely reinforced this Spartan conviction. To Spartan eyes, the strategy of devastation appeared to be working, creating a readiness for negotiation in Athens. The need for more radical measures, like establishing fortified positions in Attica, seemed unnecessary. Annual invasions, they believed, were sufficient to achieve their objectives.
Pylos: A Strategic Earthquake and the Rise of “Adventure”
The year 425 marked a turning point in the Archidamian War, a strategic earthquake triggered by the Athenian capture of Pylos. This event shattered the foundations of the “conventional” Spartan strategy. Pylos, a fortified Athenian outpost in the Peloponnese, effectively denied Sparta the ability to continue their annual invasions of Attica with impunity. Suddenly, the perceived effectiveness of the “conventional” strategy evaporated.
Faced with this new reality, Sparta was forced to embrace the “adventurous” path more fully. To sustain this more expansive strategy, a radical internal reform became necessary: the large-scale deployment of helots, the enslaved population of Laconia, as soldiers. This was a momentous shift, as Sparta traditionally relied on its citizen-soldiers, the Spartiates. However, the need for manpower to support “adventurous” operations, particularly naval and overseas campaigns, outweighed traditional constraints.
The utilization of helots opened up new possibilities for Sparta. It paved the way for Brasidas’ northern campaign, a key example of the “adventurous” strategy in action. Brasidas, a charismatic and energetic Spartan commander, aimed to incite revolts among Athens’ allies in Thrace, further undermining Athenian power and resources. His initial successes fueled hopes that this “adventurous” approach could deliver a decisive blow against Athens.
Internal Spartan Divisions: Liberation vs. Negotiation
The ascendance of the “adventurous” strategy, however, did not resolve the internal strategic divisions within Sparta. A debate emerged regarding the best way to proceed. Brasidas and his supporters advocated for a continued focus on fomenting revolts and expanding the war, believing this was the path to liberating Greece from Athenian domination. After capturing Amphipolis, a strategically vital Athenian colony, Brasidas called for reinforcements and began shipbuilding on the Strymon River, indicating his ambition to further escalate the “adventurous” war effort.
However, a faction within Sparta favored a different approach, prioritizing the recovery of the Spartan prisoners captured at Sphacteria and seeking an end to the war through negotiation. Reinforcements for Brasidas were delayed, and a year’s truce was negotiated in the hope of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement. This division of opinion became even more apparent after the Peace of Nicias in 421. Clearidas, appointed harmost of Amphipolis, refused to hand the city back to Athens, remaining loyal to Brasidas’ vision of using it as a base for further “adventures,” rather than a diplomatic bargaining chip.
In hindsight, the proponents of a negotiated peace in 421 appear to have been strategically more astute. Brasidas’ energy and charisma, while initially effective, could not compensate for Sparta’s fundamental weakness: the lack of naval power. Until Athens suffered catastrophic naval losses, as they did later in Sicily, and until Persia provided substantial financial support to build a powerful Peloponnesian fleet, the “adventurous” strategy was fundamentally limited. The revolts instigated by Brasidas proved unsustainable in the long run, as Sparta lacked the capacity to adequately support them. Even a small Athenian force under Nicias was sufficient to contain Brasidas and begin the process of recovering lost territories. In 421, the limitations of the “adventurous” strategy were becoming increasingly apparent.
The Shadow of Political Division: Differing Policies, Differing Strategies
Beyond purely strategic considerations, the differing Spartan approaches to the war may have been intertwined with deeper political divisions and conflicting policy objectives. The peace negotiations of 425, initiated by Sparta, revealed a stark contrast to the lofty pronouncements of liberating Greece with which Sparta had begun the war in 431. The Spartan appeal for peace in 425 included a remarkable statement: “If you and we concert policy, the rest of the Greek world, being weaker, will, you may be sure, pay us the greatest honour.” This suggests a willingness to abandon the cause of liberating Greece and instead forge a hegemonic partnership with Athens, effectively dividing control of the Greek world.
Brasidas, in stark contrast, embodied the original Spartan war aim of liberation. In his speech to the Acanthians, he declared, “I and my army have been sent out by the Lacedaemonians to give reality to the claim which we made in our proclamation at the beginning of the war, namely that we would fight the Athenians for the freedom of Hellas.” He even felt compelled to offer the Acanthians solemn oaths guaranteeing the independence of any state he brought into alliance, indicating a lack of trust in the commitment of some in Sparta to his liberationist vision.
Thus, the “adventurous” strategy, championed by Brasidas, became associated with a radical policy of genuinely liberating Greece, while those who sought a negotiated peace with Athens were willing to compromise on this initial war aim. This political division may have its roots in Sparta’s historical dilemma stemming from the Persian Wars.
Sparta’s Enduring Dilemma: Hegemony or Partnership?
The Persian Wars had presented Sparta with a fundamental choice: to embrace hegemony over Greece or to retreat into its Peloponnesian sphere of influence. While Sparta initially led the Hellenic League against Persia, the naval nature of the conflict and Sparta’s inherent limitations as a land power created tension. The actions of Pausanias, the Spartan regent, ultimately led to Sparta’s withdrawal from active leadership in the wider Greek world. Despite internal debates, Sparta ultimately ceded hegemony to Athens, choosing to prioritize its security within the Peloponnese.
However, this dilemma never truly disappeared. A persistent division remained within Sparta regarding whether to actively oppose Athens or to seek a partnership. As long as Athens aggressively pursued its imperial ambitions with the support of the Delian League, Sparta was forced to react, leading to periodic conflicts and tensions.
The Thirty Years Peace, negotiated in 446, represented an attempt to codify a balance of power between Athens and Sparta. However, the invasion of Attica by King Plistoanax in 446, followed by a sudden withdrawal and the subsequent peace treaty, suggests a willingness within Sparta to avoid a decisive confrontation and instead seek accommodation with Athens. Accusations of bribery against Plistoanax and his ephor, Cleandridas, likely reflect the strategic confusion and internal divisions within Sparta regarding their policy towards Athens. The peace, despite Sparta’s military advantage in 446, indicates a significant faction within Sparta that preferred a negotiated settlement over the complete destruction of Athenian power.
This underlying political division, between those who sought to crush Athens and those who wished to coexist, continued to manifest itself throughout the Archidamian War and beyond, influencing strategic choices and ultimately shaping the course of the conflict.
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Lysander and Callicratidas
Even in the later stages of the Peloponnesian War, during the Decelean and Ionian War, this fundamental division within Sparta persisted. Lysander, the architect of Sparta’s final victory, embodied the “adventurous” spirit and the unwavering commitment to liberating Greece, even if it meant relying on Persian support. He understood that Persian financial backing was essential to build a fleet capable of defeating Athens.
In contrast, Callicratidas, Lysander’s successor as nauarch, represented the faction within Sparta that favored reconciliation with Athens, even at the cost of abandoning the liberation of Greece. His disgust at having to court Persian favor and his stated desire to reconcile Athens and Sparta highlight the enduring tension between these two opposing viewpoints. Figures like Endius, deeply involved in peace negotiations with Athens in 421 and 410, further exemplify the faction within Sparta willing to compromise on the liberationist war aims in pursuit of a negotiated settlement.
The terms offered by Endius in 410, based on each side retaining their current possessions, would have left Athens in control of a significant portion of its empire, effectively betraying the proclaimed goal of liberating Greece. This willingness to prioritize a negotiated peace, even at the expense of their allies and their stated war aims, underscores the enduring political divisions within Sparta.
Thucydides’ Enduring Justification of Pericles
In conclusion, the scholarly analysis strongly suggests that Thucydides’ unwavering support for Pericles’ strategy was not misplaced. Pericles, a master of both politics and strategy, astutely recognized the fundamental limitations and internal divisions within Sparta. He understood that if Athens adhered to his defensive, naval-focused strategy, Sparta’s inherent weaknesses would prevent them from achieving a decisive victory. Sparta, lacking the naval power and the unified political will to consistently pursue a more “adventurous” strategy, was ultimately constrained to seeking negotiated settlements, settlements that would inevitably fall short of their initial war aims and potentially undermine their long-term security.
Pericles foresaw that Sparta’s strategic options were limited, and that a negotiated peace, from Sparta’s perspective, would be a catastrophic admission of their inability to liberate Greece and a tacit acceptance of continued Athenian power. This strategic insight, coupled with his understanding of Sparta’s internal political divisions, is what underpinned Thucydides’ enduring admiration for Pericles’ strategic foresight. Thucydides, in his historical account, sought to highlight the wisdom of Pericles’ strategy not just in its immediate military implications, but also in its profound understanding of the long-term political and strategic landscape of the Peloponnesian War. History, as interpreted by Thucydides, ultimately vindicated Pericles’ strategic genius, not because it guaranteed Athenian victory (which ultimately eluded them), but because it accurately predicted the limitations and self-inflicted wounds that would plague Sparta’s war effort.
