The Munich Agreement, which was signed on September 30, 1938, during a conference with the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, allowed Germany to take control of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. The idea behind this move was that it would appease Adolf Hitler and stop him from expanding further, ultimately preventing another world war.
Greater Germany
To get why world leaders acted the way they did at Munich, we need to rewind to 1935 and check out Hitler’s land grabs. Ever since he took power in 1933, Hitler had been telling the German people he’d reclaim the territories lost after World War I and the embarrassing Treaty of Versailles. Plus, he was all about Lebensraum or “living space” for Germans, meaning he wanted new lands for them to thrive. His foreign policy was super aggressive, leading to a series of territorial gains. First up, Germany got back the Saar region, which is rich in coal and had been under League of Nations control since WWI. In March 1935, the people there voted overwhelmingly to rejoin Germany.
Feeling bold due to the lack of international pushback against Japan invading Manchuria in 1931 and Italy invading Ethiopia in 1935, Hitler then moved into the Rhineland, which was supposed to be demilitarized according to the Treaty of Versailles. German troops marched into the Rhineland in March 1936.
Hitler officially rejected the Treaty of Versailles and kicked off a rearmament program. In 1936, he teamed up with Italy, forming the Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact. By 1938, he set his sights on Austria, where he was born. The Anschluss would bring another 6.7 million German speakers into what he called his “Greater Germany.” Austria had valuable resources and cash reserves, plus it would give Hitler a solid base for future expansion. He mobilized his army, which crossed the border on March 12. He had three big advantages: half the Austrian population supported him, the Austrian army couldn’t put up much of a fight, and Mussolini, the fascist leader of Italy, promised not to interfere. The Austrian government gave in, radio broadcasts urged people not to resist, and Austria became part of the Third Reich.
Hitler figured that Britain and France probably wouldn’t go to war over this.Britain and France were all in on trying to keep Hitler happy, thinking that if they let him have what he already grabbed, he’d chill out and stop expanding. They figured this land grab didn’t really warrant a world war since most of the areas taken had German speakers, and a vote in Austria showed that people were mostly okay with it. But Hitler wasn’t done yet. He set his sights on Czechoslovakia, especially the Sudetenland, and by May 1938, he was telling his generals he wanted to take over all of Czechoslovakia.
The Sudetenland
Czechoslovakia was a democratic republic where Germans were just a minority, which was a totally different ballgame compared to Hitler’s earlier conquests. This time around, he couldn’t just rely on intimidation; he had to play the diplomatic game to get what he wanted instead of sending in troops. There was a lot at stake since Czechoslovakia had strong defenses, a solid industrial base, and a well-equipped army of a million soldiers.
Looking back, especially knowing that Hitler went on to conquer more territory in both the East and West, his claim that Czechoslovakia was like an enemy aircraft carrier in Central Europe makes a lot of sense. Sure, he took advantage of the mistakes made by his future foes, but if he really aimed to control Europe, he needed to deal with Czechoslovakia first. The Sudetenland, which was mostly German-speaking and surrounded by Germany on three sides, was the perfect target for him to start with.
Hitler figured that Britain and France wouldn’t want to go to war in 1938. Even though the USSR and France had a treaty from 1935 promising to protect Czechoslovakia from outside threats, the USSR would only step in if France acted first. Hitler doubted that France would take the lead, especially without British support. So, the British government’s stance was crucial during what became known as the Czech Crisis.
Czechoslovakia came into existence after World War I, formed from areas that used to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. President Edvard Beneš led a diverse population of about 10 million Czechs, 3 million Slovaks, 3 million German speakers, along with Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Poles. The Czech majority ran the government, which left other groups feeling underrepresented and unhappy. Hitler saw this discontent as an opportunity and funded parties like the Nazi Sudeten German Party (SdP), led by Konrad Henlein, to stir up trouble. He made speeches claiming that Sudeten Germans were being oppressed, which was completely false. Meanwhile, Joseph Goebbels, the German propaganda minister, launched a campaign spreading misinformation to back up these claims.
Chamberlain Meets Hitler
Back in 1938, Hitler told his generals to whip up a plan for invading Czechoslovakia, which they called Fall Grün or ‘Case-Green.’ Troops were shifted to the southern border, and they had a secret start date set for September 30. It looked like he was gearing up for an invasion, but maybe he was just trying to pressure for a diplomatic win instead? On top of that, there was some serious dissatisfaction with Hitler among the higher-ups in the German military. The army wasn’t really ready for a full-blown war. Sure, they could hold their own against the Czechoslovak forces, but if France decided to jump in, they’d be in big trouble. As British MP Robert Boothby put it:
All the German generals were convinced that if war broke out over Czechoslovakia in September 1938 they would have been defeated in about three weeks…They had intended to arrest Hitler and proclaim a military government. (Holmes, 71)
If Hitler could snag Czechoslovakia without firing a shot, he’d be untouchable back home. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain thought diplomacy could keep the peace. He met with Hitler in Bavaria on September 15, hoping to convince him to back off from attacking Czechoslovakia. Hitler suggested that Germany could take the Sudetenland if a vote showed the locals were cool with it. Chamberlain was on board and got Hitler to promise no military moves until the British Parliament discussed it and France was consulted. Hitler agreed, giving him more time to get Case-Green ready.
The British and French governments went along with Hitler’s request, but the Czechoslovak government shot it down, fearing it would eventually lead to total domination by Hitler. Britain and France then told Czechoslovakia that if they didn’t hand over the Sudetenland, they wouldn’t lift a finger to help them later on. As Beneš put it, they felt completely betrayed (Shirer, 391).
Chamberlain was super eager to share some good news, so he met up with Hitler on September 22. But Hitler, sensing that Chamberlain was desperate to avoid war at all costs, upped his demands. He insisted that Czechoslovakia had to give up land to both Poland and Hungary, and that all Czechs needed to leave the Sudetenland, taking only a tiny bit of their stuff with them. Chamberlain was okay with these new demands in theory, but when they were brought to the British Parliament, they shot them down, and the French government did the same. Meanwhile, Beneš was getting the Czechoslovak army ready for action. On September 26, Hitler gave a speech in Berlin slamming the Czechoslovak government. The next day, Britain got its navy ready. It looked like war was right around the corner, and Chamberlain famously said during a BBC radio broadcast at 8:30 p.m.:
“How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.”
The Munich Conference
Europe narrowly avoided war at the last minute. Late into the night, Hitler and Chamberlain were sending telegrams back and forth. Hitler proposed that Germany would take over the Sudetenland but promised to respect the rest of Czechoslovakia’s independence. A message was sent to Mussolini, who wanted to stall any conflict since Italy wasn’t ready for war, asking him to convince Hitler to set up a meeting in Munich. This way, the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy could try one last time to sort things out peacefully.
Hitler agreed to Mussolini’s idea. So, the Munich Conference took place at the Führerbau building in Munich on September 29 and 30, 1938. The U.S. didn’t show up because they were sticking to their isolationist stance, and neither the USSR nor Czechoslovakia got an invite. The USSR had just gone through a huge purge of its military, making it seem too weak to help, and Chamberlain wasn’t keen on trusting Stalin. Plus, everyone already knew where Czechoslovakia stood.
More Affairs
Agreement to Appease
The appeasement strategy was really put to the test now. Since 1935, leaders around the world had hoped that Hitler’s latest land grab would be his last. They were desperate to avoid another world war, but not at any price. Sadly for Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland was seen as an easy sacrifice. There were some, like Winston Churchill, who strongly opposed appeasement. Even those who thought it wouldn’t work still believed it might buy some time for countries to build up their defenses. However, public sentiment in Britain and France was against both war and rearmament. So, when the Munich Agreement came about, it was a relief for many, including Hitler, whose economy and military weren’t quite ready for a fight.
Chamberlain was all about peace and genuinely believed he could trust Hitler. His assistant, John Colville, pointed out:
Chamberlain was really committed to peace; to him, war was the worst thing ever. He had seen his peers die in Flanders during World War I and felt it was his mission to prevent such horrific losses from happening again.
Chamberlain’s appeasement approach had the support of most Brits. Rab Butler, who was the British under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, mentioned:
If you want to understand why we didn’t take a stand in 1938, it was because the country was flooded with peace propaganda… The military hadn’t been reactivated, the public was pacifist, and the Commonwealth was split, which wasn’t the case in 1939. Plus, American opinion wasn’t on our side during Munich.
At the Munich conference, France was represented by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier (1884-1970). Just like Chamberlain, Daladier had lived through the horrors of WWI. Unfortunately for him, France was totally unprepared for another war. Mussolini, who represented Italy, was in a similar boat; he figured his military wouldn’t be ready for action until 1943. So, he was okay with playing the neutral mediator at Munich. Meanwhile, Hitler also faced issues with his military’s readiness and loyalty. On the morning of the conference, he met up with Mussolini on his train, and they agreed that whatever decisions were made that day, there would come a time when they’d have to fight together against France and England (Shirer, 414). Interestingly, Daladier and Chamberlain didn’t have any pre-conference chats like that. They both convinced themselves that it was fine to hand over the Sudetenland since it never got its promised vote for self-determination from the Treaty of Versailles. So, all four leaders at Munich were pretty eager to delay war, no matter the cost. Ironically, the only country actually ready for war was Czechoslovakia, which wasn’t even there.
During the Munich conference, each leader took turns speaking in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere, according to an interpreter named Dr. Schmidt. The meeting went on for several hours as Mussolini put forth what Hitler had told him to suggest earlier that day. In short, Hitler got exactly what he wanted. The Munich Agreement was signed by Germany, France, Italy, and Britain at 1 a.m. on September 30.
Points of the Munich Agreement
The Munich Agreement laid out a few key points:
- Germany was set to take over the Sudetenland by October 10.
- An international commission would recognize Germany’s new borders.
- Czechs had to vacate the Sudetenland by October 10, and the area couldn’t be stripped of its resources.
- The rest of Czechoslovakia was promised independence, and there were supposed to be plebiscites (which never actually happened).
- Germany and Italy agreed to acknowledge the new borders and vowed to protect the rest of Czechoslovakia from any future attacks (but that also never came to pass).
When German troops rolled into the Sudetenland, the mood after the conference was surprisingly light. Daladier shared war stories while Chamberlain talked about fishing with Hitler, who looked down on them and later referred to them as ‘little worms’ (Stone, 110). Two Czech diplomats were brought to Munich just to hear what the big powers had decided for their country. The people of Czechoslovakia felt completely let down. In a dramatic moment, Hitler signed a document drafted by Chamberlain, promising that Britain and Germany would never go to war against each other.
Consequences of Munich
When Chamberlain got back home, he proudly told the British folks that he had secured “peace with honor” and “peace in our time” (Shirer, 420). Roosevelt even sent a message saying, “Good man” (McDonough, 78). Chamberlain was even put up for a Nobel Peace Prize! Ironically, he didn’t win it; instead, the 1938 prize went to a group focused on helping refugees, started by Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930). Daladier also returned to a warm welcome from relieved crowds. Meanwhile, Hitler enjoyed a triumphant parade in Berlin. Albert Speer, who would later become Germany’s armaments minister, noted that Hitler’s followers were now fully convinced of his invincibility (169). Goebbels, being more realistic, remarked that they were all hanging by a thread over a bottomless pit, but now they felt solid ground beneath them again…everyone was thrilled about maintaining peace (Gellately, 280). Even Jewish diarist Victor Klemperer had to admit on October 5 that Hitler pulled off a strategic miracle: Munich is Hitler’s Austerlitz (270), comparing it to Napoleon’s famous victory at the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805.
On October 5, 1938, the Sudetenland officially became part of Germany, and Henlein was appointed its Gauleiter (regional governor). By the second week of October, Poland snatched up the eastern part of Teschen (known as Český Těšín to Czechs and Ciesyn to Poles). Then on March 14, 1939, Slovakia declared independence, encouraged by Hitler to help dismantle Czechoslovakia, but it ended up as a German puppet state led by Jozef Tiso (1887-1947). The next day, under the excuse of being invited to restore order (McDonough, 80), German troops marched into what was left of Czechoslovakia (mainly Bohemia and Moravia). Hungary took control of southern Ruthenia and parts of Slovakia, both areas with significant Hungarian populations. So, instead of saving Czechoslovakia, Munich ended up destroying it.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-2004-1202-505 (CC BY-SA)..Way over in the east, Stalin figured out that the Western powers were totally okay with Germany growing, as long as it was at his expense. A Soviet diplomat pointed out that not being at Munich meant they avoided stepping on a shaky board (Taylor, 237). So, Stalin needed to find new buddies for the upcoming war. In August 1939, Germany and the USSR teamed up with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (also known as the Nazi-Soviet Pact).
In March 1939, Germany took over Memelland in Lithuania, and then Mussolini moved into Albania in April. After that, Britain and France stepped in to promise they’d protect Poland’s borders. It finally hit the Western governments that the fascists were all about expanding their territory, no matter what. Hitler brushed off any diplomatic efforts, leading to the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Once again, Europe—and soon the whole world—was plunged into war.
Looking back, it’s clear that the Munich Agreement was a blunder, a missed chance to stand up to Hitler before he got even stronger. As Boothby put it, Munich was one of the biggest disasters in British and French history (Holmes, 70). But it’s worth mentioning, as historian A. J. P. Taylor points out, that when things went south with the Munich policy, everyone claimed they saw it coming… but honestly, nobody was as insightful as they later pretended to be (232-3). This was really Hitler’s big win at Munich, but it was a hollow victory that would eventually lead to Germany’s near-total destruction in World War II (1939-45).
