For over a decade, the United States has pledged to make Asia a focal point of its foreign policy, yet it has repeatedly fallen short of following through. The recent book Lost Decade by Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine explores this ongoing challenge and argues that America’s failure to decisively pivot to Asia may rank among its most significant policy missteps since World War II. This article revisits America’s pivot to Asia, what went wrong, and what a successful strategy would look like to effectively counter China’s growing power.
The unrealized pivot
The concept of the “pivot to Asia” gained prominence in 2011 when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a shift away from U.S. focus on the Middle East toward a more Asia-centered approach. With China rising as a regional and global power, U.S. leaders recognized that Asia’s strategic importance was undeniable. The region is home to some of the world’s largest economies, powerful militaries, and influential universities, making it a key player in global economic growth and technological innovation. Given these factors, a robust American presence in Asia was critical to maintaining U.S. influence.
However, the pivot largely remained an aspiration rather than a fully implemented strategy. Successive administrations, from Obama to Trump to Biden, have been constrained by competing priorities and crisis management elsewhere. Efforts to engage with Asia have often been fragmented, focusing on tactical responses rather than a cohesive and long-term strategy to counter China’s growing dominance.
The cost of delayed action
According to Lost Decade, the United States’ delayed focus on Asia has allowed China to expand its influence with limited resistance. Under President Obama, there was early recognition of the need to pivot, but execution was inconsistent. Military assets intended for the Indo-Pacific were still largely tied up in the Middle East, and proposed economic partnerships like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were abandoned. By the time Obama declared that 60% of the U.S. naval fleet would be based in Asia, the fleet was insufficient to deter China’s navy effectively.
Under Trump, the approach shifted to a direct confrontation with China, focusing on tariffs and trade deficits rather than multilateral alliances. But Trump’s threats to reduce troop presence in Japan and South Korea raised doubts among U.S. allies, weakening regional confidence in America’s commitment. President Biden has sought to strengthen Asian alliances and support Taiwan, yet his attention has frequently been diverted by crises in Europe and the Middle East.
Blackwill and Fontaine suggest that these setbacks stem from a lack of clear focus and an unwillingness to take the risks necessary to ensure a successful pivot. Inconsistent engagement has also allowed China to make inroads in smaller, strategically located nations such as the Solomon Islands, where China recently secured the right to resupply naval vessels—a critical asset in any future military confrontation in the Pacific.
Diverging views and domestic distractions
One of the key challenges hindering a more decisive pivot is the absence of a unified American vision on China. While some U.S. policymakers see an immediate threat requiring a rapid military buildup, others view the risk of conflict as less urgent, fearing that a strong U.S. military presence might provoke a conflict rather than deter it. Additionally, there is an ongoing debate over whether the U.S. should prioritize short-term readiness or invest in long-term modernization, which has prevented clear policy direction.
Domestic politics also complicate matters. U.S. leaders have often been reluctant to make bold moves in Asia that could have domestic repercussions, such as reallocation of funds from other regions or implementing ambitious trade policies. Moving military resources from Europe and the Middle East has been challenging due to ongoing commitments in these regions, as well as fears of backlash from allies and domestic constituencies wary of a shift in focus.
More Affairs
What the U.S. needs to do
Blackwill and Fontaine argue that the United States cannot afford more half-measures. They advocate for a comprehensive strategy that includes strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific, rebuilding economic partnerships, and bolstering military capabilities specific to countering China.
1. Build stronger, issue-focused alliances in Asia
The U.S. should move beyond traditional alliance structures and form coalitions that address specific challenges, such as economic coercion and cybersecurity. This approach can engage allies and partners on shared concerns without requiring a formal military alliance. Working with countries like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines on tailored security and economic initiatives would enhance regional resilience against Chinese influence.
2. Bolster military presence and stockpile critical weapons
To counter China’s growing military power, the United States needs a well-equipped and strategically positioned military force in Asia. Blackwill and Fontaine emphasize the need for high-tech weapons like long-range anti-ship missiles, precision-strike missiles, and submarines capable of engaging in undersea warfare. Unlike surface ships, which are vulnerable to China’s missile capabilities, submarines and other stealth assets would provide the U.S. with a sustainable advantage in the region.
3. Enhance economic engagement and partnerships
China has strengthened its ties across Asia through investment and trade. To regain economic influence, the United States should consider rejoining multilateral trade agreements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which would strengthen trade ties with regional partners. Additionally, Blackwill and Fontaine recommend that the U.S. provide financial incentives and other support to Southeast Asian countries to reduce their economic dependence on China.
4. Engage European allies in the China strategy
Encouraging European allies to adopt similar standards on technology, cybersecurity, and human rights would create a unified front against China’s economic practices. However, the book acknowledges that Europe has diverse views on China and may not easily align with the U.S. on all strategic issues. As a result, the U.S. should identify areas of mutual interest and establish issue-based partnerships with European nations to avoid potential conflicts with their economic agendas.
Going beyond the pivot
While Blackwill and Fontaine provide a robust to-do list for completing the pivot, Oriana Skylar Mastro, in her review of Lost Decade, suggests that even these measures may not be enough. She argues that the U.S. needs a total mobilization of resources to face China’s rise effectively. Rather than merely reallocating existing resources, Mastro proposes that the U.S. should:
- Invest in emerging military technologies suited to the Indo-Pacific.
- Strengthen ties with Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia and Vietnam by offering economic and security benefits in exchange for access to strategic areas.
- Expand U.S. influence in the South China Sea by supporting allied fishing and oil exploration operations, even offering to protect these activities against Chinese interference.
Mastro contends that if China continues its assertive actions, the U.S. should consider shifting its neutrality on disputed territories, potentially favoring nations that oppose China’s maritime claims. Additionally, uniting Southeast Asian claimants around shared maritime interests would strengthen regional resistance to Chinese expansionism.
The urgency of decisive action
The United States has the opportunity to reclaim its position as a key power in Asia, but time is running out. Blackwill, Fontaine, and Mastro agree that America needs to move beyond aspirational rhetoric and embrace tangible, well-coordinated actions if it hopes to counter China effectively. The stakes are high: a successful pivot not only upholds U.S. influence in Asia but also contributes to global stability by curbing China’s potential to dominate one of the world’s most strategic regions.
In the years ahead, a decisive, sustained strategy in Asia could be the key to maintaining a balanced world order, protecting democratic values, and ensuring that U.S. allies feel confident in America’s commitment. For the pivot to succeed, America must act swiftly and boldly, leveraging its alliances, resources, and influence to maintain a stronghold in Asia before it’s too late.
