US History

The Rise of Populist Conservatism in America

The American Right's blend of big money and grassroots anger has its roots in the tumultuous 1930s, a time of global upheaval.

The current political landscape in the United States is marked by a powerful and often volatile alliance between wealthy elites and a passionate, sometimes radical, base of popular support. This fusion of plutocracy and populism, a defining characteristic of the American Right, has its origins in the global economic and political turmoil of the 1930s. This era witnessed the American Right forging a “common cause with an enduring global Right forged in the age of fascism,” as historian Joseph Fronczak argues in his insightful reinterpretation of American conservatism.

Fronczak’s work highlights a “transnational intellectual traffic” of “ideas, claims, and practices” during the Great Depression that effectively translated European fascism into an American context. This involved creating a popular, militant base among the economically vulnerable lower middle class, who found common ground with wealthy elites in their defense of property rights and traditional values. This alliance was underpinned by a shared belief in the importance of “white supremacy, Christian fundamentalism, and vigilante justice” as pillars of American society.

The emergence of this “popular Right” as a potent counterrevolutionary force was vividly illustrated by the collaboration between businesses and vigilante groups in their efforts to suppress labor organizing efforts across the country during the 1930s. These groups saw the burgeoning labor movement as a threat to the established social order and economic hierarchy.

One particularly revealing episode in this era was the trip undertaken by broker Gerald MacGuire to Europe in the early 1930s. Commissioned by a committee of Wall Street bankers, MacGuire’s mission was to study the use of paramilitary groups as instruments of authoritarian control. He was particularly interested in the squadristi, or Blackshirts, who had played a key role in Mussolini’s rise to power in Italy, and the Freikorps and Sturmabteilung, or Brownshirts, of the Nazi Party in Germany. MacGuire saw these groups as models for the kind of “mass political mobilization, anti-democratic and capitalistic” force that could be used to dismantle the New Deal, which many conservatives viewed as a dangerous slide towards socialism.

MacGuire’s interest in paramilitary tactics gained notoriety when retired Marine Corps Major General Smedley Darlington Butler claimed that MacGuire had approached him in the summer of 1934 with a proposition: to lead a private army of veterans in a coup d’état against President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Butler, a highly decorated veteran of numerous military campaigns, including the Spanish-American War, the Philippine-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Mexican Revolution, World War I, and the Banana Wars in Central America, ultimately became a vocal critic of American imperialism. He famously described himself as a “high class muscle man for Big Business” and a “gangster for capitalism,” expressing regret for his role in enforcing American corporate interests abroad.

The extent and details of what became known as the Business Plot or Wall Street Putsch remain a subject of historical debate. However, the fact that such a plot was even considered underscores the depth of conservative opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal. James Van Zandt, commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, acknowledged the existence of the conspiracy, and later, as a Republican Congressman, he advocated for the removal of the word “democracy” from the American lexicon, believing it to be tainted by communist influence. Notably, neither Van Zandt nor Frank Belgrano, the head of the American Legion, were called to testify in the official Congressional investigation into the alleged plot, which Fronczak describes as having met a “disquietingly quiet death.” Belgrano himself was a member of the committee that sent MacGuire to Europe and worked for banker Amadeo Giannini, a prominent Mussolini supporter whose Bank of Italy would later become Bank of America.

While the 1934 coup never materialized, Fronczak argues that the “design to couple high capital and popular mobilization” represented a “genetic event” for the “US modern Right,” which has since been characterized by its unique fusion of these two elements. This alliance has proven to be a potent force in American politics, shaping the conservative movement’s agenda and influencing its strategies.

It is crucial to remember that prior to Pearl Harbor, support for Mussolini and Hitler was widespread among America’s business elite. Many hoped that the fascist regimes would eradicate both the threat of Bolshevism and the perceived “class traitor” Roosevelt. However, fascism’s appeal was not limited to the upper echelons of society. It was a powerful form of mass mobilization, fueled by fantasies of national rejuvenation and racial purity, and united by a shared hatred of perceived enemies, including leftists, Jews, homosexuals, Blacks, liberals, Mexicans, and transpeople.

As Fronczak notes, fascism was a global phenomenon. “With images of blackshirts in Rome circulating the globe in newsprint and film,” he writes, “blackshirts cropped up to beat migrant farmworkers in California, blackshirts fought unemployed demonstrators in London, blackshirts patrolled the streets of Córdoba, Argentina, and blackshirts marched in Kenya, taking up the slogan ‘Make Kenya a White Man’s Country.'”

The influence of fascist ideology extended far beyond Europe. Fascist groups, distinguished by their distinctive colored shirts, emerged in various parts of the world: greyshirts in Johannesburg and Cape Town, Beirut and Damascus; blueshirts in China, Spain, Portugal, and Egypt; greenshirts in Cuba and France; and goldshirts in Mexico City, who brutally attacked a pro-labor demonstration, killing five. The open-palmed fascist salute became a recognizable symbol of this global movement, appearing everywhere from Chicago to Cairo, Bucharest to Manila, Dublin to Madison Square Garden.

Elites, by their very nature, constitute a small minority. To maintain their power and privilege, they require allies, both on the streets and in the political arena. They need muscle to enforce their will, and they need votes to legitimize their rule. The lesson that American conservatives learned in the 1930s, and which they carried into the Cold War and beyond, suggests Fronczak, was that embracing elements of the fascist playbook could be an effective strategy for achieving their goals.

The legacy of this era continues to resonate in contemporary American politics. The fusion of corporate power and populist mobilization that emerged in the 1930s remains a defining characteristic of the American Right, shaping its ideologies, strategies, and alliances. Understanding the historical roots of this alliance is essential for comprehending the dynamics of American politics today.

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