In the seventeenth century, two figures—Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza—shook the foundations of moral and political thought. Labeled “atheists” in their own day (a charge as potent then as “communist” might be in modern America), both were regarded as outrageous innovators who dared to challenge the accepted order. Expelled from the synagogue, attacked by the Anglican clergy, and scorned by their contemporaries, these thinkers raised questions that extended far beyond academic debate. Their ideas provided new ways of understanding sovereignty, law, property, and the nature of moral obligation—a legacy that would come to underpin modern social life.
In this post, we explore how Hobbes and Spinoza questioned the old moral schemes and paved the way for a new doctrine of natural rights and individual liberty. We will examine how their theories intersected with the practical dilemmas of their society, how different national contexts (such as France and England) influenced the role of philosophy in social change, and how competing moral backings eventually led to the rise of modern political thought.
Challenging the Established Order
Both Hobbes and Spinoza struck a deep chord with the social and political turbulence of their times. Their contemporaries found their ideas so radical that they branded them as “atheistic.” Yet beneath the controversy lay an attempt to answer fundamental questions about the nature of moral obligation and the justification of authority. In France, for example, philosophy became a tool for critiquing established norms—questioning the concepts of sovereignty, law, and property. In England, however, philosophical analysis was more likely to justify the existing order. These contrasting national responses highlight the fact that philosophy does not exist in a vacuum; its role is inextricably linked to the social and political context in which it arises.
For Hobbes and Spinoza, traditional bases for moral judgment—whether rooted in divine command or in the established social order—were no longer sufficient. Instead, their work moved toward a more critical examination of the underlying assumptions of morality. They questioned whether moral rules were justified simply because they were part of a given social structure or were the arbitrary commands of a divine lawgiver. Their inquiries set the stage for later debates about how best to justify our moral standards in a world where multiple, often conflicting, criteria could be advanced.
The Spectrum of Moral Backing
Throughout the history of ethics, scholars have recognized at least three major ways to justify moral rules:
- The Functional Good of Social Life:
Drawing on the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, this perspective holds that moral judgments are grounded in the recognition and pursuit of goods that are essential for the flourishing of human life. In this view, the concept of “good” is used functionally—certain roles, actions, or relationships are deemed good because they are well suited to the needs of a community. Moral standards, then, are intrinsically linked to the way social life is organized. - Divine Command and Reward:
The Christian tradition offers a different kind of backing for moral rules. Here, moral imperatives are articulated as divine commandments—“Thou shalt” statements that come with the promise of reward for obedience and the threat of punishment for disobedience. This view holds that the ultimate moral standard is not human reason but the will of God. However, this approach also leaves little room for independent moral judgment, as moral worth is entirely determined by adherence to these external decrees. - Consequentialist or Instrumental Justification:
Finally, there is the view advanced by the sophists and later by Hobbes himself, which sees moral rules as technical instructions for achieving desired ends. Under this view, moral judgments are of the form “If you want X, you must do Y.” Here, the backing of a moral rule rests on its ability to satisfy our immediate desires or to avoid harm. Although this might seem practical, it risks reducing morality to a simple calculation of pleasure versus pain—ignoring the possibility that human nature and desires themselves can be transformed.
Each of these approaches presupposes a particular theory of human nature and the physical universe. The Aristotelian model sees moral life as emerging from an intrinsic understanding of human purpose, while the Christian model is based on obedience to transcendent authority. Hobbes’ approach, influenced by the sophists, treats human desires as fixed and self-interested. Yet even within these frameworks, it is possible to combine and vary elements—a synthesis most notably achieved by thinkers like Aquinas, who blended Greek philosophy with Christian doctrine.
Philosophy and Social Change: Diverging National Traditions
The relationship between philosophical criticism and social change can differ markedly from one society to another. In France, philosophers often used their work to undermine the existing social and political order. Their analyses of sovereignty, law, and property were inherently critical, providing intellectual ammunition for those who sought to challenge tradition. French thinkers drew on the revolutionary potential of philosophical inquiry to argue for a new social order based on individual rights and equality.
In England, however, philosophy traditionally played a more supportive role. The English social order, with its emphasis on stable institutions and inherited rights, served as a model that many French intellectuals later used to critique their own society. English philosophers tended to justify the current order by showing how established norms had evolved naturally or were supported by pragmatic considerations. In such an environment, debates about moral justification often seemed theoretical—confined to the halls of universities rather than influencing everyday life.
Yet even in England, the latter part of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw a transformation in the underlying moral scheme. Debates shifted from questions of divine command and inherited obligation to concerns about the satisfaction of human needs and the rights of the individual. This period marked the beginning of a fundamental reordering of moral and political values—a reordering that would eventually lead to the rise of modern liberal thought.
When Sacred and Secular Collide
Social change reaches a fever pitch when traditional boundaries between sacred and secular begin to crumble. In an earlier era, moral and political questions might have been settled by appealing to the omnipotence of God or the unquestioned authority of the sovereign. However, as societies evolve, the criteria that once guaranteed a unified answer to the questions “What standards ought I to accept?” and “What ought I to do?” begin to diverge.
Consider a social order where multiple rival criteria are at work:
- Divine Command: What God supposedly commands or is believed to command.
- Sanctioned Authority: What is enforced by those in power, backed by the threat of punishment.
- Legitimate Authority: What is endorsed by a recognized sovereign or governing body.
- Instrumental Satisfaction: What appears to lead to the satisfaction of our immediate wants and needs.
In periods of stability, these criteria may converge, giving the appearance of a unified moral order. But in times of upheaval—when church and state, king and parliament, or rich and poor begin to fall apart—the divergence becomes apparent. Rival factions might redefine their opponents’ criteria: a Hobbesian might argue that legitimate authority is simply victorious power; a Puritan might claim that what God commands is what would naturally satisfy our true desires were it not for the corruption of sin; a royalist might insist that obedience to the king is what God commands.
These disputes are not mere academic exercises. When the foundations of society are in flux, theoretical debates about the proper justification of moral standards move from the classroom to the battleground. The competing criteria for moral judgment become intertwined with struggles over power, wealth, and individual freedom.
The Question of Logical Backing for Moral Rules
A central philosophical problem is determining what kind of backing is appropriate for moral rules. What warrant do these rules require to be considered valid? As we have seen, the history of ethics provides at least three different answers, each reflecting a distinct conception of human nature and society. The functional approach of Plato and Aristotle, the divine command model of Christianity, and the instrumental, desire-driven approach of the sophists and Hobbes each lead to a different logical form and status for moral judgments.
For the Aristotelian view, the key concept is “good”—not in an abstract, universal sense, but as a quality that fits a role in a particular social order. Moral judgments are assessments of whether certain actions or roles are conducive to the flourishing of life. In the Christian model, the imperative is expressed in the form “Thou shalt,” with moral value determined by the consequences of obedience or disobedience (reward and punishment). In the Hobbesian or sophistic approach, moral rules are essentially pragmatic guidelines: they tell us what means will lead to our desired ends.
The challenge is that each approach seems to presuppose a different theory of human nature. The Aristotelian model assumes that human desires are malleable and that our actual desires can be reformed by a proper education in virtue. The Christian model holds that our desires are irrevocably corrupted by sin, making divine intervention the only path to moral transformation. Meanwhile, the Hobbesian view treats human desires as fixed and self-interested—a state of nature in which every individual must fend for himself, only cooperating to the extent that it serves his own interest.
Critics of the instrumental view point out that if our desires are left unexamined, they may justify actions that are harmful to others—consider, for instance, how medieval or modern societies might have justified the persecution of minorities if the pleasure of conformity outweighed the pain inflicted on the persecuted. This possibility raises an important question: Can human nature itself be transformed so that our desires align with higher ideals, rather than simply satisfying our immediate wants? Both the Aristotelian and Christian traditions answer affirmatively, while the Hobbesian view remains largely pessimistic.
The Rise of Natural Rights and the Social Contract
The debates about the proper backing for moral rules culminated in a revolutionary doctrine: that of natural rights. Emerging from the turmoil of the seventeenth century, this doctrine posits that every individual inherently possesses certain rights simply by virtue of being human. Unlike rights derived from divine command or the benevolence of a sovereign, natural rights claim their validity from the very nature of the individual. This idea is epitomized in the writings of thinkers such as Richard Overton, whose arguments paved the way for later theorists like John Locke.
The doctrine of natural rights is based on the premise that no one has a legitimate claim against you unless they can prove that you have, either explicitly or tacitly, consented to such a claim. In other words, rights are not bestowed by a state or by divine decree; they are inherent conditions of individual existence. This argument is particularly compelling when contrasted with the idea of the social contract. While Hobbes attempted to justify state authority by arguing that individuals transfer their rights to a sovereign in exchange for protection, the doctrine of natural rights holds that any legitimate claim of authority must be based on the consent of those governed.
This view has radical implications. It suggests that the legitimacy of state power—and indeed, the legitimacy of any claim upon an individual—depends on a kind of contractual agreement. If no such consent is given, then any assertion of authority is, at its core, illegitimate. This insight laid the groundwork for later political revolutions and the modern emphasis on individual liberty and equality before the law.
Transformation of Moral and Political Ideals
As economic growth and social mobility increased in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the nature of human desire and the basis for moral judgment began to shift. In England and New England, for instance, Puritanism evolved from a force that critiqued the established order in the name of King Jesus into an ideology that endorsed the burgeoning economic activities of the middle classes. In this transformation, human nature was increasingly seen as fixed and self-interested, with the satisfaction of individual wants becoming the primary standard for evaluating actions.
Writers like Daniel Defoe captured this new reality vividly. Defoe observed that the zeal for religious doctrine had diminished, replaced by a belief that economic success and the rational pursuit of profit were the highest goods. His characters, from Robinson Crusoe to Moll Flanders, are emblematic of a society in which economic utility and individual capital have come to define personal worth. Even religious values were subsumed under economic imperatives. As one character observes, “with money in the pocket one is at home anywhere”—an observation that underscores the transformation of moral values into market values.
Yet even as economic imperatives took hold, the idea of the individual as a moral agent remained central. The emergence of the novel, with its focus on individual experience, helped to enshrine the notion of individual liberty as a core value. This shift was not complete, however. The traditional hierarchies and social bonds that had long structured society continued to exert influence, and many still believed that some vestiges of inherited rights and responsibilities should persist.
It was in this context that the radical ideas of the Levellers and the Diggers gained prominence. These groups, active during the English Civil War, advanced the doctrine of natural rights in a revolutionary form. They argued that every man had a natural right to freedom and that any government must be based on the consent of the governed. Colonel Thomas Rainborough, speaking during the Putney debates of 1647, famously asserted that even the poorest man in England had the same right to life and liberty as the richest. Such ideas, though suppressed at the time, would later become foundational to modern liberal thought.
The Enduring Impact on Modern Political Thought
The evolution of moral philosophy from the seventeenth century to today can be traced directly to these early debates. The doctrines of natural rights and the social contract would be further refined by thinkers such as John Locke, whose ideas on individual liberty, property rights, and government by consent became central to modern political theory. Locke’s work, in many respects, was a synthesis of earlier insights. He combined the notion that individuals possess inherent rights with a pragmatic understanding of the state as a necessary institution for securing those rights. Locke’s philosophy thus provided the intellectual foundation for later movements advocating for democracy, constitutional government, and the rule of law.
Locke’s ideas resonated powerfully in an era when the legitimacy of state authority was increasingly questioned. As the power of the state became more centralized and as traditional social bonds weakened under the pressures of economic change, the idea that legitimate authority must be based on a social contract gained traction. For Locke and his successors, the legitimacy of political power was no longer derived from divine right or inherited status but from the tacit—and sometimes explicit—consent of the governed. In this new order, the rights of the individual took precedence, and the role of the state became one of protecting those rights rather than imposing arbitrary rule.
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Reconciling Moral and Practical Concerns
At its core, the modern discourse on morality and politics revolves around the question: What should be the basis of our moral rules and political obligations? Is it divine command, inherited social order, or the pragmatic calculus of human desire? The debates initiated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and the early advocates of natural rights reveal that these questions cannot be answered in isolation. They depend on a broader theory of human nature—a theory that recognizes both our capacities for reason and our susceptibility to selfish impulses.
In many ways, the challenge is to reconcile our theoretical ideals with the messy realities of social life. For instance, while it may be tempting to argue that every individual naturally possesses certain rights, the practical implementation of this ideal requires a framework of law and order. This framework, in turn, must be justified not solely by abstract notions of justice but by its ability to secure the conditions for a flourishing human life. In this sense, the work of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and others is not merely theoretical—it is deeply intertwined with the practical demands of governance, economics, and social cooperation.
Moreover, the debates over the logical backing of moral rules remind us that there is no one-size-fits-all answer. The Aristotelian view emphasizes the role of human nature and the cultivation of virtue, while the Christian model stresses obedience to divine command. The consequentialist approach, as exemplified by Hobbes and later by utilitarians, focuses on the outcomes of our actions. Each approach has its strengths and its weaknesses. What becomes clear is that modern moral and political thought is the product of a long and complex process—a process in which ideas are continuously re-evaluated in light of changing social conditions.
Conclusion
The intellectual journey from the radical ideas of Hobbes and Spinoza to the establishment of natural rights and modern liberal democracy is a testament to the power of philosophical inquiry to transform society. Though they were once reviled as atheists and heretics, Hobbes and Spinoza set in motion debates that would redefine the relationship between the individual and the state. Their willingness to question traditional moral authorities opened the door for new ways of understanding justice, liberty, and human flourishing.
Today, the legacy of these early modern thinkers is evident in the doctrines that underpin contemporary political systems. The notion that every person has inherent rights, the idea that legitimate government is based on the consent of the governed, and the recognition that moral and political standards must be continually re-examined in light of human nature—all of these ideas owe a debt to the critical spirit of Hobbes, Spinoza, and the revolutionaries who followed in their footsteps.
As society continues to evolve, the questions they raised remain as urgent as ever: What is the proper basis for our moral rules? How can we justify the authority of the state? And, ultimately, how can we reconcile our highest ideals with the practical demands of everyday life? In seeking answers, we not only honor the intellectual legacy of these thinkers but also continue the ongoing dialogue about the nature of freedom, justice, and human dignity.
